NIST has published the final version of its post-quantum transition roadmap. Every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm is deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and US federal high-value systems get harder deadlines still. New Zealand still has none of its own. Reference: Moody D, Perlner R, Regenscheid A, Robinson A, Cooper D. Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography […]
The post-quantum cryptographic answers are now largely agreed. Applying them — especially to authentication — is the hard part. Cloudflare’s move to become a certificate authority shows one way it gets done for the web. Bitcoin shows why the same answer doesn’t transfer everywhere. And Europe’s €47.5 million quantum-internet bet won’t help anyone migrating before […]
Six stories broke in the space of three weeks in September 2026, and none of them, on its own, looks like big news. Read together, they mark a shift in what “post-quantum readiness” means. For two years the industry conversation has been about which algorithm to pick and when to switch it on. That question […]
The world has agreed on the maths of post-quantum cryptography. It has not agreed on how to use it — and the traffic on the wire has already changed shape. Four developments from the past fortnight, and what they mean for New Zealand. There is a comfortable version of the post-quantum story in which the […]
Standfirst: A validated hardware security module, a bill aimed at the electricity grid, and a Finnish research programme pointing at the certificate layer. Three developments in one week say the same thing: the hard part of the post-quantum transition is no longer cryptographic. A fourth — a vendor blog doing the rounds again — is […]
A look into how and who’s actually farming your encrypted data, and why most of the crop rots.
On 28 July, Anthropic published two cryptanalysis results produced with its Claude Mythos Preview model. One improved an attack on a reduced-round variant of AES — theoretically interesting, practically irrelevant, and not our subject here. The other is a genuine problem for HAWK, a post-quantum signature scheme that NIST advanced to a third round of […]
Three weeks in June and July produced hard US deadlines for post-quantum cryptography, a blunt statement from the US military about which quantum-safe technologies don’t count, and a machine-checked paper on what it actually costs to break RSA-2048 and P-256. New Zealand remains the only Five Eyes member with no migration deadline at all. For […]
Our read of a sweeping new survey of quantum computing and security keeps circling back to one under-addressed problem. Two specialist papers from the same week show why getting your organisation quantum-safe is becoming harder, not easier. Three papers landed on arXiv in the space of a fortnight in late May and early June, and […]
On 2 June 2026 we re-ran our post-quantum cryptography (PQC) readiness scanner against the same 118 New Zealand critical infrastructure entities we assessed on 14 April 2026. Seven weeks is a short interval for a cryptographic migration story — and the headline number reflects that: the overall PQC rate moved from 52.6% to 52.2%, essentially […]
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